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Biblical Truth and Theological Education:
A Rhetorical Strategy
PATRICK R. KEIFERT

We have been asked to attend to two key questions about the role of the
Bible in theological education:
When we say that the Bible is true, what do we mean?
What methods of interpretation appreciate the truthfulness of the
Bible?
I propose to use a rhetorical strategy for attending to the question of truth
and interpretive methods, one that, in a surprising way, confounds mod
ern expectations about the speaker, the audience, and the ways in which
the subject — namely, God and the Word of God through the norming
norm of the Scripture — are to be present. These two questions drove the
thinking of a course that Donald Juel and I taught at Luther Seminary for
some fourteen years; and with these questions as referents, I have sought
to address thoughtful Christian biblical scholars who want some starting
points for helpful conversations about theories of truth and the teaching
of the Bible in their classrooms.1 This argument begins with the assumpi. See the introduction to this volume; see further Juel and Keifert, “A Rhetorical Ap
proach to Theological Education," in To Teach, To Delight and To Move: Theological Education in a
Post-Christian World, ed. David S. Cunningham (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2005), pp. 281-96; see
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tion that the Bible is the Christian Bible, and, more importantly, that the
Bible is Scripture. That is, as Scripture the Bible makes a claim about us
and on us: our attention is not unidirectional, as if we alone are posing the
question of the Bible’s truth. Rather, we attend conversationally: God
through the Bible also poses a question to us about the ultimate truth of
our lives. To understand the Bible as Scripture, as rhetorical conversation,
is not to deny that the Bible’s truthfulness can be assessed in other ways —
for example, for its accuracy as historical knowledge about ancient Near
East cultures or as a source of anthropological data in these cultures. In
theological education, however, the most life-giving questions we can ask
are about the Bible as Scripture, that is, about what is being asked about
the truth of our own lives.

Ethos and Speaker
Permit me to set the horizon within which I answer these questions as a
way of getting at the identity of speaker in the study of the Bible as Scrip
ture. As the setting for this conversation, I am imagining how I would be
gin a conversation with a classroom of theology students in a North
American Christian denominational seminary.2
Theological education has its center in understanding God truly.3 Yet,
also Keifert, "The Bible and Theological Education,” in The Ending of Mark and the Ends of God,
ed. Beverly R. Gaventa and Patrick Miller (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 2005),
pp. 165-82.
2. I currently teach classes that are largely secular in a private, church-related law
school, as well as church-renewal training classes for lay Christians and others. In principle,
there are significant similarities in the way I would confront the truthfulness of the Bible in
a denominational seminary and in a secular private law school and in a church-related law
school, even though my students' attention is not so directly focused on the question of the
Bible as Scripture.
3. My debt to the work of David H. Kelsey, especially his To Understand God Truly: What’s
Theological about a Theological School (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992). is obvi
ous. But unlike Kelsey’s proposal, which is an extremely helpful space for a conversation
about truth, this chapter reflects not a universal but a particular location for theological and
confessional reflection on the question of biblical truth.
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contrary to the expectations of some beginning seminarians who hope
for some immediate and clear insight or transformative experience, to un
derstand God truly we must often begin at most unlikely sources. Indeed,
the looks on their faces when we make our first reading assignments tell
us just how impossible it seems to them that they will begin to understand
God truly in this classroom setting. But we must begin in unlikely places,
for God is only known indirectly.4 The simultaneously hidden and re
vealed nature of God5 necessitates an indirect knowing, a learning that is
accomplished through a set of practices.6 These practices of knowing God
largely grow, not within the self, for the self, and out of the self, according
to the common wisdom; but they grow out of the congregation, that is,
the face-to-face interaction of persons through the public practices of the
Christian thing.7
Indeed, the congregation is the primal setting or location of all the
practices that make possible the indirect knowing of God truly. Chief
among the ways we practice the Christian thing is in worship, and for one
important reason: at its center, worship as a practice reflects the Christian
community's belief that the chief speaker in our conversation — the chief
actor in our movement toward understanding — is not us but God. (Need
less to say, Christians are also involved in practices of understanding God
truly in other important locations. However, they do not function in the
same primal way as the face-to-face gathering around word and sacra4. Kelsey, Understand, pp. 34ff.
5. Clearly, in this proposal I follow the Reformers, especially Luther and Calvin, on the
hiddenness of God. I find B. A. Gerrish’s analysis of Hiddenness 1 and II, especially in Luther,
a most helpful framework for discussing the nature of this hiddenness. See B. A. Gerrish,
“To the Unknown God: Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God," in The Old Protestant
ism and the New (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 131-49. Luther’s argument
as pursued by Gerrish is in clear contrast to the various doctrines of God implied in indirect
understanding found in other classic Christian figures.
6. Kelsey, in Understand, distinguishes four methods of Christian wisdom, or ways in
the understanding of God: "contemplation, discursive reasoning, the affections, and the ac
tion that comprise a Christian’s life." I develop these four ways, or methods, differently from
Kelsey because of the particular piety out of which I teach Christian theology.
7. Following Kelsey, Understand, p. 32: “I will use the phrase ’nominalistically’ simply as
a place-holder for all communities of practice and belief who call themselves ’Christian.’”
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ment does. These locations are indeed different in kind, for in word and
sacrament God has specifically promised to be present as self-giving, selfsacrificing, liberating, justifying, and loving. God can, of course, be pres
ent to us in this distinct way in all times and in all places by the power of
the Holy Spirit; however, the entire Christian thing is warranted by the
promise of God’s saving presence in the moment of word and sacrament.)
As the chief speaker, the chief actor, God promises to make God’s self
present as self-sacrificing, self-giving, liberating, justifying, and reconcil
ing love.8 God promises through word and sacrament to gather people
and the entire creation into the triune life of God. In its broadest sense,
worship is whatever one does when one is aware of the presence of the
holy.9 But for us as seminary teachers — and this is critical to our teaching
of the practice of worship — Christian worship is whatever we Christians
do out of the awareness that we are being called, gathered, and enlight
ened by the ongoing breaking-in of the promise of God’s presence. We are
thus the responsive audience in that rhetorical moment, not the One who
speaks the truth. For Christians, consequently, while word and sacrament
are central, worship cannot be contained in the formal liturgy of the peo
ple, in what we speak back in particular moments. Rather, worship con
tinues as Christians encounter the word of God speaking to them in their
everyday lives. This encounter, this listening, this worship is the Chris
tians’ leiturgia and diaconia — their reasonable service.

8. This list of metaphors for the presence of God is not exhaustive but it does include
some of the central metaphors for the unique presence of God that warrants the Christian
thing. Since the theory of truth out of which this proposal works especially reflects the met
aphorical nature of the experience of truth, these metaphors are more than mere images of
another thing, such as salvation — as if salvation is not just one more metaphor. Rather,
these metaphors make present what they signify. As metaphors, they function as freezedried narratives or poems or prophetic utterances.
9. Here 1 borrow from a substantial philosophical discussion of worship, especially
from the work of Ninian Smart, The Concept of Worship (London: Macmillan, 1972).
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Pathos and Audience
Christian worship is always directed toward the world for the sake of the
mission of God in the world. The practices that make up a true under
standing of God, then, are practices that move us toward the world. So, for
example, though meditation and contemplation of God are important
Christian practices for knowing God truly, they do not lead Christians
away from the world to some other place where God dwells, some other
moment where one can be alone with God. Nor do other Christian prac
tices, such as social action or critical reflection. All of these practices seek
to de-center the self, to help the self recede so that we may understand
God truly through the other. They are all practices that play on the biblical
metaphor of hospitality to the stranger.10 And they are all mediated
through the written Word of God.11
The biblical metaphor of hospitality to the stranger suggests that, in
understanding God indirectly, we experience three major de-centering
moments, moments that again confound modern common sense about
the “audience" for our understanding. In modern common sense, we who
want to know or understand are the major actors, those who control the
stage of knowledge or control the end of our rhetoric. Our conversation
partners or the objects of our knowledge are, effectively, the audience for
our understanding, the stage on which we move. When we are hospitable
to the stranger, however, we are de-centered from our central role as rhe
tors, as actors by (1) the other, {2) the self, and (3) the Other.
The first moment of de-centering is perhaps the most obvious. When
the self recedes in attending to the other — whether the other is Scripture,
the Christian tradition, our own or others’ cultures, the society around us,
10. My reference is to the many passages of Scripture wherein God is present through
the stranger, the irreducibly other. For a more sustained discussion of this way of interpret
ing Scripture through its own metaphors, especially “hospitality to the stranger," see
Keifert, Welcoming the Stranger (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1991). Of course, this formulation of
the question of truth and Scripture is deeply indebted to the work of the Jewish philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas, as my discussion in Welcoming the Stranger indicates.
11. This notice of the written Word of God leaves open the very important question of
the relationship between the viva Vox and the written word.
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the faces of the poor and the vulnerable, the call of the neighbor, the fellow
creature, and so forth — the possibility of understanding God truly arises.
The second moment is less obvious, though equally clear if we think
about it. When we are de-centered by these Christian practices, we also
experience our own self as another.12 The illusion that we are selves fully
possessing ourselves, fully controlling who we are, evaporates. The com
mon sense that life is a process in which we are finding or becoming or
gathering together a single, unencumbered self proves a deadly chimera.
The wisdom that the meaning of life is about “getting yourself together”
for yourself proves foolish. The Christian practice of understanding God
truly through the other gives us a new self, a self for the other, and a self as
another. In my own Lutheran tradition, this is what we mean when we
speak of Christian liberty.13 If the moment of knowing God truly is the
moment in which we experience the call of the other and of the self as
other, then the nonsense that the Christian is the perfectly free lord of all
and the perfectly dutiful slave of all begins to make sense.
The third moment of de-centering that takes place in the Christian
practices of understanding God truly is the moment when we encounter
God through the other. Within the Lutheran tradition this encounter is
summarized in two ways: in any encounter with a fellow creature, we
come before an irreducible other that gives evidence of traces of the Other
who obliges us to be of service to that other human. In the encounter with
the other in the shadow of the cross, we also encounter the mystery of the
One who promises life in the midst of death, victory in the midst of defeat,
and participation within the very life of God hidden in the everyday prac
tices of the Christian’s life.

12. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
13. Martin Luther, On Christian Liberty (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003). In this text Luther
explores the metaphorical logic of the conjoined phrases “perfectly dutiful slave of all” and
"perfectly free Lord of all,” his way of understanding Christian freedom and faith. Note also
the very helpful analysis that follows my line of argument in Eberhard jungel’s commentary
Freedom of a Christian (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988).
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Practices
As the most obvious example, meditation and contemplation as ancient
practices of understanding God are not an improvement on or substitute
for the indirect knowledge of God. They do not do away with the necessity
of engaging in other disciplines or practices of understanding God truly.
They are simply among those practices. Contemplation and meditation
are, to be sure, important practices because they bring together and over
lap with the affection, passions, and primal sensorium of the human
person.14 In the tradition that I practice, singing a hymn until my selfconsciousness recedes links the practices of contemplation and medita
tion to my primal senses. As I engage in a practice designed to help my
self-consciousness recede, I meditate on the presence of God through the
other and then contemplate God’s presence in word and sacrament.15 And
if I choose a hymn from my Lutheran or another Christian heritage,
hymn-singing also links my particular liturgical and theological tradition
to older Christian practices of contemplation and meditation.
Social action on behalf of the poor and those most vulnerable is a sim
ilarly venerable and proven practice for understanding God truly. But so
cial action dovetails with — even joins with — the ascetic practices of
contemplation and meditation rather than competing with or excluding
14. Here my debt to Walter Ong’s concept of the human sensorium is obvious. His con
cept also shapes the later discussion of ways in which the experience of the truth is shaped
by the rhetorical events of Scripture in Christian practice.
15. The experience of the truth that is irreducibly that of identity in difference rather
than identity in similarity is, then, irreducibly metaphorical in character. It is also the en
counter of identity only through the irreducibly other. Here I follow both Paul Ricoeur, es
pecially in Oneselfas Another, and Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriori
ty (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 53ff.. where he correctly, I believe,
criticizes notions of truth based on individual autonomy that have dominated Western the
ories of truth. I also follow Robert Scharlemann's construal of the question of truth as “the
experience of truth as a theological problem," in The Being of God: Theology and the Experience
ofTruth (New York: Seabury Press, 1981). While I recognize that these figures have significant
differences on questions of the interpretation of the self and truth, the conversation they en
gender on understanding God and the questions of truth are for me the most fruitful for my
overall proposal.
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them. Perhaps the most profound lesson Mother Teresa left us is that so
cial action and ascetic practice are not different in kind or opposed to each
other but of a piece — indivisible — in understanding God truly.
These practices or ways of understanding God are organically related
to the practice of critical reflection, another way of knowing God truly.
We moderns perhaps recognize critical reflection more readily as indirect,
though the Christian tradition has not always isolated critical reflection as
the indirect way of knowing God, as modern thought has taught us to do.
But contrary to some claims about understanding God, Christians do not
need to sacrifice intellect or discursive reasoning to understand God truly,
nor to understand them as lesser ways of understanding. While the rea
soning intellect is only one of multiple intelligences that make up human
understanding, those who would claim that it is somehow inferior or de
mand that it be excluded as a means of understanding God fall into a diffi
cult trap. They mistakenly assume that there is some method to construct
boundaries between modes of human understanding without using hu
man understanding, which would seem impossible. Critical reflection is
necessary to the exercise of all of the multiple intelligences that are God's
gift to us for understanding God truly.
Within this horizon, Christian theological education both presumes
and teaches these Christian practices that are the Christian thing. Chris
tian theologians invite critical reflection on and under these presumed
and taught Christian practices. In my setting in a denominational semi
nary, and even more clearly when I teach in a secular setting, I cannot pre
tend that, when I am teaching about these practices while not actually
practicing them, I am practicing the core of the Christian thing. For in my
tradition that core is the movement of God toward the world in word and
sacrament. I can, however, teach those practices and invite public discur
sive reasoning about which practices seem true to this understanding of
God, and about how they can be adapted and instantiated to be true to
that understanding. In short, a school of theology in my tradition cannot
and should not simply presume, but should also teach, these varied prac
tices for understanding God truly.
Since the movement of God toward the world as self-giving, selfsacrificing, liberating, and reconciling love drives all my action in the
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world, it must drive my action in the classroom and my seeking for truth.
And since the chief norming norm for all indirect evidence of God’s move
ment toward the world through word and sacrament is the Bible, all my
work in a school of theology must involve these practices related to the Bi
ble. Notice, I have not said that the Bible is the object of my faith or its
foundation. It is the norming norm of my indirect understanding of God
truly. The question of biblical truthfulness, then, is not a separate question
but a subset of the question of understanding God truly. I do not imagine
that the Bible has some foundational status, not for persons of faith, much
less for those who do not have faith in “the God who raised Israel’s Jesus
from the dead.”161 do not seek to demonstrate its truthfulness aside from
its place within my search — with others — to understand God truly.
My initial answer to the question “When we say that the Bible is true,
what do we mean?” is quite simply this: the Bible is true insofar as it makes
possible the understanding of God truly. In addition, in my own heritage
this can be focused further by saying: “What makes Christ present” within
our practice of the Christian thing?17 Furthermore, those methods that
appreciate its truthfulness are many. They include ascetic practices such
as meditation and contemplation, singing, dancing, practices of social ac
tion on behalf of the vulnerable and poor, and the playful interaction of
critical human understanding with text and tradition.18
16. Robert Jenson, Christian Dogmatics, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), p. 99: "The
gospel identifies its God thus: God is the one who raised Israel's Jesus from the dead. The
whole task of theology can be described as the unpacking of this sentence in various ways.
One of those produces the church’s trinitarian language and thought.”
17. Martin Luther’s “was Christum treibt” — what necessitates, drives us to, delivers
Christ (from “Prefaces to the New Testament,” Luther's Works: American Edition, ed. J. Pelikan
et al., 55 vols. [Saint Louis: Concordia and Philadelphia: Fortress, 1955-1986], 35:396).
18. In these last few phrases, my proposal owes a profound debt to the work of Hans
Georg Gadamer, especially in his concept of tradition as Wirkungsgeschichte (history-ofeffects), truth-seeking as interpretative play, and phronesis (practical reasoning). I have ex
tended the concept ofphronesis in my development of Christian wisdom. However, one need
not draw only on the continental tradition, as I have. The work of Stephen Toulmin, espe
cially his discussion of human understanding and the history of Enlightenment thought, is
congruent with this proposal; see his Cosmopolis (New York: Free Press, 1990) and Human
Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972).
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Second, truth is irreducibly metaphorical. All truth — even the sup
posedly univocal truth claims — rely on indirect understanding through
the other. Truth, even as correspondence — and a correspondence the
ory of truth can be reclaimed by way of a second naivete — is identity in
difference, not identity in sameness.19 The truth claims that Scripture
makes on us take very different rhetorical shapes and strategies. We
must attend to these rhetorical strategies and shapes to determine the
kind of truth claim that is being made. Following a semantic, pragmatic
model of truth would require us to admit that assessing the truth of “2 +
2 = 4” is rather different from assessing the truth of “I promise to be
faithful to you.” The character of those rhetorical strategies must pro
foundly affect how we decide whether our processes of interpretation
and assessment are appropriate to the public, communal character of
our conversation.
For example, in assessing the truth of a promise, an act of commit
ment, of self-giving, I would probably not ask, “Is the promise true?” (as I
might about the arithmetic equation), or “Did it really happen?” (as I
might ask about a historical event). Rather, I would ask, “Was the promise
fulfilled?” This is a more important question for the biblical scholar, be
cause the inherent logic of promise, especially the eschatological prom
ises, dominates much of Scripture. Without simply reducing Scripture to
a set of narrative promises, it is still fair to say that an assessment of the Bi
on a
ble’s truth claims must depend on its truth claims to us and on us
response to the Promiser, an assessment of the faithfulness of the
Promiser in fulfilling promises.20
Still other passages of the Bible function more as personal stories, as
acts of self-disclosure and self-communication. In looking at these pas
sages, we might more appropriately ask whether the teller’s story coheres
with what we know in other ways about the teller and about the world.
19. Robert Scharlemann, The Being of God, pp. 153—83.
20. Here I largely agree with Ronald Thiemann in Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as
Narrated Promise (Notre Dame, 1985), and yet I part company with the Yale School’s practice
of projecting the rhetorical category of narrative on all of Scripture. I agree with the
friendly critique Mark Wallace makes (see Chapter 4 of this volume) of Lindbeck et al., using
Ricoeur’s analysis of the primal rhetorical strategies of the Bible.
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When the teller and the self-discloser is God, assessing the truth of the
story involves assessing the story of all history, of all creation.21
As we recognize that the question of truth returns to us as a question
that envelops and encompasses our own present discourse, we realize that
we are unable to find some external, objective location or stance from which
we can base our assessments. In practical teaching terms, this means at the
very least that we cannot simply attend to some abstract “theory” of the Bi
ble’s role in human experience. Rather, we must centrally attend to the lived
practices that will dominate theology students’ peculiar role within Chris
tian communities. Because my students are to be leaders in Christian com
munities of mission, I need to use interpretive methodologies to encounter
Scripture that will teach them the skills appropriate to this leadership role.
As I have suggested, in the classroom I teach the use of Scripture as a
way of understanding God truly through various Christian practices, par
ticularly the practices of leadership. The interpretation and practice of
teaching Scripture needs to embody a similar schema of practices and ac
tion. In addition to the venerable premodern traditions, I also try to pro
vide a framework for students to use methods of interpreting Scripture in
the modern period. I display these methods along a continuum, from the
transparency of the text to a world behind the text to a complete opacity
of the text to any reference — in other words, the text as self-enclosed
world. Modern methods, in distinction to premodern and postmodern
methods, are arranged from those that assume a high level of correspon
dence between text and referent to those that assume little or no corre
spondence between text and referent. When I teach students these diverse
21. This argument follows the work of my colleague Mary Knutsen, "The Holocaust in
Theology and Philosophy: The Question of Truth,” in Holocaust as Interruption, ed. E. S.
Fiorenza and D. Tracy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), pp. 67-74. See also Donald Evans, The
Logic of Self-Involvement (London: SCM, 1963), revising Ricoeur’s proposal in "Toward a Her
meneutic of the Idea of Revelation," in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis Mudge (Phila
delphia: Fortress, 1980). Ricoeur does not fully develop a semantic theory of truth in his at
tention to biblical rhetorical strategies and the kinds of assessments that stories of self
disclosure involving God might entail. His work raises the thorny question of how one
might possibly assess the truth claims of a universal story that includes and encompasses
our lives as well, including the part of our lives that is now engaged in talking with others
about how to assess this story.
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methods for interpreting Scripture, I differentiate those that explore the
reference between the text and things behind the text (historical para
digm) from those that refer to things in front of the text (linguistic para
digm). I further divide these paradigms: I divide the historical methods be
tween those who believe the text refers to events behind the text in the
world of the ancient text and those who believe that the text can only
truthfully refer to the world of the author of the ancient text. I divide the
linguistic paradigm between those who focus on the rhetorical strategy22
of the text and those who hold that the text reflects deep structures of the
culture of those who wrote them and similarly the deep structures of the
readers who interpret them.
By this time, it is no surprise to the reader that I invite students into in
terpreting Scripture through an imaginative free play around the ques
tions of a rhetorical strategy.23 As I have noted above, one practice of par
ticular interest is that of public leadership in the church. This involves a
specific rhetorical strategy on the part of the leader (student). Robert
Terry provides an excellent heuristic tool for analyzing the present state of
a community with respect to any question facing students and their abil
ity to act.24 Since the prejudice of my understanding of the relationship
between biblical truth and interpretation is through shared action, Terry’s
focus on action fits my pedagogical purposes well. He describes six kinds
of topics regarding action: existence, resources, structure, power, mission,
and meaning. Within a community stuck on one of these topics, Terry
shows how forward movement is to make progress in conversation lead
ing to concrete action.
22. By using “rhetorical strategy,” I deliberately avoid the habit of many biblical schol
ars to reduce rhetorical analysis to a genre analysis, a taxonomy of the text. A rhetorical
strategy takes into account the shaping of audience, the disclosure of speaker, and the pecu
liarity of the speech. Thus, while narrative is a prominent rhetorical strategy in Scripture,
even in the Pauline Epistles (since Paul presumes a shared narrative for his argument), the
rhetorical strategies of Scripture are many, and they cannot be subsumed into a narrative
analysis.
23. See further Juel and Keifert, "A Rhetorical Approach to Theological Education,”
cited above (n. 1).
24. Robert Terry, Authentic Leadership: Courage in Action (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Pub
lishers, 1993).
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Terry’s work on leadership can be more than a tool for furthering
shared action. It can also be a helpful heuristic through which we might
imagine the metaphors for the experience of truth within which our stu
dents can encounter Scripture in ways critical to their ministry of leader
ship. According to Terry, one way to imagine useful metaphors for the ex
perience of truth is to think of a continuum: on one end are those
practices that exhibit a high level of sameness, continuity, consensus, and
agreed-on tradition; on the other end are those practices that display a
high level of difference, discontinuity, dissonance, experimentation, in
vention, and innovation. For heuristic purposes, I imagine these theories
of truth — now metaphors embodied in practices and actions — with at
least seven zones of practice and action, as Terry enumerates them.25
These tools are by no means the only tools for the teaching practices
that I believe are faithful to the truthfulness of the Bible as the norming
norm of our understanding God truly. Indeed, I use several others. My
point in sharing these tools is to show how I teach students to use — and
to evaluate their use of — Scripture in leadership practices that allow
them to integrate the substantial critical theory they are usually taught in
school with the critical practices for understanding God truly. It frees stu
dents to integrate a diversity of venerable practices into their lives as lead
ers of Christian communities, and it undercuts the tendency for them to
presume that discursive reasoning is at best irrelevant to leadership and
that modern practices of leadership do not embody certain notions of
truthfulness and ways of understanding God. Even more importantly, it
makes a theological critique of such practices of leadership far more likely.
In short, one extremely important strategic value of this approach, for me,
is how it obviates the theory-practice split.
One other strategic value is the integrating of public and private prac
tices of understanding God truly. In the modern period, the divide be
tween public and private became common sense. The supposedly public
ways of understanding anything were associated with “critical reason,”
which presumed an unencumbered self capable of placing all reasonable
25. Robert W. Terry, Seven Zones for Leadership: Acting Authentically in Stability and Chaos
(Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black, 2001).
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subjects within its domain. This strategy follows a recognition that such
presumptions on a certain mode of understanding are unwarranted and,
further, that a much more particular, specific, occasional, and rhetorical
mode of understanding is warranted as reasonable and public.
I have been advancing a specific rhetorical argument in this chapter
concerning the Bible and truth. The question of the truth of Scripture
does not occur in splendid isolation from the practices of the church,
which seek to understand God truly. Understanding Scripture as the
norming norm of life and faith within real congregations helpfully em
beds various theories of truth for the Bible within larger rhetorical strate
gies for congregational leadership. Such an approach to teaching and
learning about the truth of the Bible reveals that modern practices of lead
ership in the church do indeed embody certain notions of truthfulness
and ways of understanding God truly.
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